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Although machines designed to socially
interact with humans are proliferating,
our understanding of the mental pro-
cesses supporting such interactions
remains limited.
The cognitive and brain sciences can
make considerable theoretical and
methodological contributions to this
endeavour.
To date, themodal approach to cognitive
science-informed human–robot interac-
tion research has been grounded inEmily S. Cross ,1,2,4,* and Richard Ramsey , 3,4
As robots advance from the pages and screens of science fiction into our homes,
hospitals, and schools, they are poised to take on increasingly social roles.
Consequently, the need to understand the mechanisms supporting human–
machine interactions is becoming increasingly pressing. We introduce a frame-
work for studying the cognitive and brain mechanisms that support human–
machine interactions, leveraging advances made in cognitive neuroscience to
link different levels of description with relevant theory andmethods.We highlight
unique features that make this endeavour particularly challenging (and rewarding)
for brain and behavioural scientists. Overall, the framework offers a way to study
the cognitive science of human–machine interactions that respects the diversity
of social machines, individuals’ expectations and experiences, and the structure
and function of multiple cognitive and brain systems.social cognition.
We widen the lens through which
much of this research has been
framed to incorporate diverse and
interacting forms of cognition, which
emphasise the complexity of under-
standing human–robot interaction
on a mechanistic level.
Our framework seeks to account for the
unusual demands on (neuro)cognition
presented by engaging with social
machines, focusing on machine variety,
diverse neurocognitive systems, and
unique contextual factors such as
media-skewed expectations.
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emily.cross@mq.edu.au (E.S. Cross).From Social Cognition to Social Machines
Over a decade ago, Microsoft founder Bill Gates prophesied a robotics revolution that would see
staggering leaps in the progress and sophistication of robots, and predicted ‘a robot in every
home’ in the near future [1]. Although the ubiquity of household robots has yet to be realised,
we are opening our doors to an increasing number of artificially intelligent machines (see
Glossary). Concurrently, a growing number of robotics start-ups are focusing on developing com-
panion robots for the home or assistance robots to serve in complex, human-interactive contexts,
including schools, hospitals, and care homes [2]. As progress towards developing machines that
take on increasingly sophisticated social roles continues apace, the cognitive and brain mecha-
nisms that underpin social engagement with these machines remain largely unknown. A greater
understanding of the psychological and neurobiological foundations of human interactions with ar-
tificially intelligent social machines (henceforth referred to as ‘social machines’) has important
implications for the design and programming of socially engaging and collaborative artificial agents.
It is equally critical to use this understanding of human–machine interaction to further our knowl-
edge of the flexibility and limits of neurocognitive processes supporting human social behaviour to-
wards both human and artificial agents.
Investigating the cognitive and brain mechanisms that underpin human–machine interactions is a
fledgling field that faces several unique challenges. For example, the vast range of artificially
intelligent machines, from small handheld devices such as smartphones and thermostats to
autonomous petlike robots, such as Paro and MiRo, all the way to life-sized humanoid robots,
such as iCub or Pepper, suggests that this endeavour represents a highly variable space
(Figure 1). Interactions with different robots are likely, therefore, to involve a range of different
mental processes, making a ‘one size fits all machines’ type of cognition unlikely. Furthermore,
even the most sophisticated social robots share features with inanimate objects and rudimentary
machines in addition to animate beings, such as animals and humans. Consequently, the typical
dividing lines of cognition that carve up the environment on the basis of clear categories areTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.11.009 1
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Glossary
Artificially intelligent machines:
sometimes referred to as ‘intelligent
agents,’ these are physically embodied
objects (such as a phone or thermostat)
that are equipped with technology that
enables them to perceive aspects of
their environment to help them achieve
their programmed goals (such as
unlocking a phone by comparing a
user’s face with stored templates of the
user’s face, or a smart thermostat
illuminating temperature information on
its display when it detects a person
entering a room).
Artificially socially intelligent
machines: building off the core
capacities of artificially intelligent
machines, machines with artificial social
intelligence are designed to either detect
and respond to social signals in the
environment or detect and respond to
signals in the environment in a way that is
perceived as social by human users, or
some combination of these two
possibilities. These are also referred to in
the literature as ‘social robots’ or ‘socially
assistive robots.’ They are referred to as
‘social machines’ in the main text for
simplicity.
Domain-general: processes that
operate across different stimulus or task
features.
Domain-specific: processes that are
tuned to particular stimulus or task
features.
Embodied robots: robots that are
physically present and co-located in
space with human users. Compare
these with virtual agents or voice agents,
which are not considered embodied
according to this definition.
Human–robot interaction (HRI): a
multidisciplinary research field seeking
to understand, design, and evaluate
human interactions with robots. HRI
research covers all varieties of HRI,
including factory assembly robots,
robotic protheses, and drones,
whereas the type of HRIs that are the
focus of this piece are human
interactions with robots designed for
social purposes.
Machines: apparatuses using
mechanical power and having several
parts, each with a defined function and
together performing a particular task
(definition from the Oxford English
Dictionary).
Social cognition: cognitive processes
that are engaged by thinking about and
interacting with other people.
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Figure 1. Possible Ways to Codify and Distinguish Objects, Ranging from Chairs to Social Robots.
(A) Categorisation of objects based on broadly similar features attempts to group objects into distinct kinds, such as tools,
machines, artificially intelligent machines, and artificially intelligent social machines. Naturally, however, the variety of
exemplars within each of these rough categories is enormous. (B) An alternative or complementary way to describe
objects (including artificial agents) is via a dimensional or feature-mapping approach. Dimensional approaches ignore strict
categorisation and instead focus on evaluating and comparing objects across a range of dimensions. Therefore, objects
and machines can be more or less similar to each other across multiple dimensions or features. The eight dimensions
shown here are given as possible examples to illustrate the value of taking a dimensional approach. We do not intend
these dimensions to represent a comprehensive list of relevant features; instead, we use them to spark further debate and
research concerning which features may be most relevant in particular contexts and for particular research aims. N.B.:
The actual names of the robots shown in A (referred to in the main text) are stated over the corresponding feature map
cartoons in B.
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesbroken. This presents a particular challenge when one attempts to understand how the brain
constructs mental representations that guide interactions with artificially intelligent machines.
Although thework of engineers, roboticists, behavioural scientists, and philosophers has donemuch
to inform our understanding of human–robot interaction (HRI), here we leverage discoveries
made in human cognitive neuroscience to outline a framework for studying human–machine interac-
tions that holds potential for advancing our understanding in new ways. We focus on human inter-
actions with robots that have been designed to take on social roles. As a starting point in this2 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx
Social robotics: a term encompassing
a wide variety of research relating to
robots designed to engage humans on a
social level, often in companionship or
assistance contexts. HRI is one facet of
this diverse field.
Turing Test: developed by British
computer scientist and mathematician
Alan Turing, the Turing Test is a method
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
OPEN ACCESSendeavour, we propose an updated framework that broadens the focus of HRI research beyond
social cognition and that considers (i) the important and distinct roles played by machine variation,
(ii) diverse and interacting cognitive and brain systems, and (iii) the unique challenges and opportu-
nities that research into human interactions with social machines presents (Figure 2C).
The primary value of placing HRI research into this broad framework is to better characterise the
interplay between domain-general information-processing systems, which operate across aof inquiry in artificial intelligence where a
human user probes whether a computer
(or agent) they are speaking with is being
controlled by another human user or by
artificial intelligence.
Wizard of Oz: describes a
methodological approach most often
used in laboratory studies of HRI where
a robot’s behaviours or responses are
controlled either partially or fully by a
human experimenter, unbeknownst to
the human participant.
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Figure 2. Schematic Depictions of Possible Approaches to Studying Human Interactions with Socia
Machines. (A) Traditional neurocognitive approaches have focused on using human social cognition as a template upon
which to base or compare our understanding of how robots are perceived, and how we interact with them, in socia
settings. A particular focus has been on engagement of brain regions implicated perceiving, interacting with, and thinking
about other people in social contexts, including the ventral premotor cortex (PMv), the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), and the
temporoparietal junction (TPJ). (B) An updated approach, called for in the present article, is to move beyond a reliance on
(human) social cognition and simply using the self (or another person) as a template for engaging with social machines
Instead, a fuller appreciation of more general aspects of cognition, such as object and tool perception, as well as an
individual’s expectations (shaped by media, culture, and other factors), prior experience with robots (e.g., toys), amount o
time previously spent engaging with the specific robot, and a broadening of focus beyond brain regions implicated in socia
cognition, should accelerate progress in this endeavour. (C) Schematic summary of the three main pillars of the
proposed framework. The framework highlights how to advance understanding of the mechanisms supporting human
interactions with social machines via consideration of (i) a diverse set of cognitive and brain systems that span interactions
between general and more specialised information-processing streams, (ii) widespread variation in machine features, and
(iii) the unusual demands placed on cognitive systems by human–machine interactions that present researchers with unique
challenges and opportunities. This framework may be best considered as a platform to encourage researchers to take a
broader perspective that includes more diverse viewpoints when studying cognitive and brain systems involved when
humans interact with social machines. In the future, this framework should also provide the foundation for developing and
testing neurocognitive models that make more specific predictions regarding the human side of human–robot interaction.
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Trends in Cognitive Sciencesrange of stimuli, tasks, and contexts, and those that are more domain-specific and tied to interac-
tions with other agents, such as humans and social machines. In line with this, broadening the focus
of HRI research to include theoretical and empirical perspectives beyond social cognition will be
important because, even though considerable progress has been made in understanding social
cognition, it would be a mistake to assume that our understanding of what is ‘social’ about social
cognition is clear-cut or finalised [3,4]. Therefore, adopting a broader framework to examine how
we perceive and interact with social machines promises to be fruitful because (i) it is more agnostic
about the cognitive processes supporting HRIs, and (ii) it could also help us to develop a more nu-
anced understanding of what, precisely, is ‘social’ about social cognition.
Considering Machine Variation Jointly Along Dimensional and Categorical Axes
To understand how people might perceive and interact with social machines, such as those the field
of social robotics aims to develop, it is useful to place such machines within a wider context of
entities thatwe are likely to encounter in daily life.We can think ofmachines as a subclass of objects
and tools that are physically present in the world and perform specific tasks. A wealth of cognitive
neuroscience research has charted the human brain’s response to perceiving and categorising
salient stimuli in the environment, including faces, body parts, objects, and tools (e.g., [5–11]; for
reviews, see [12,13]). This work generally converges on the finding that object and tool perception
engages a core neural network comprising premotor, parietal, lateral occipital, and ventral temporal
areas. Cognitive neuroscience research has also demonstrated that social interactions are sup-
ported by a distributed neural network spanning perceptual, affective, and regulatory functions,
which is partly dissociable from the neural networks underpinning our interactions with objects
and tools [14,15]. Therefore, much progress has been made in understanding how we perceive
and interact with objects, tools, and animate beings, based on the assumption that such entities
are processed by partly dissociable neurocognitive systems [14,16,17].
By contrast, our understanding of how we perceive and categorise artificially intelligent machines,
let alone social machines, remains limited for several reasons. First, the cognitive neuroscience of
HRI is a new field of inquiry, with a research programme in its infancy [18,19]. Second, compared
with divisions between humans, houses, and animals, for example, clear-cut categories are not as
easily agreed upon when it comes to machines, especially artificially intelligent social machines. Def-
initions of what makes a robot ‘social’ or ‘intelligent’ are slippery, may vary across people, and are
generally difficult to agree upon. With this being said, coarse categorisation is possible to some ex-
tent: Machines have automated functions compared with objects and tools, and an objective
boundary exists between even themost sophisticated machines and humans (Figure 1A). Nonethe-
less, the variety of machines within and between loosely defined categories is vast in terms of size,
shape, motion profile, and intended use or purpose (Figure 1B). This variation matters because, if
neglected, it poses a threat to the tractability of human–machine interaction research (Box 1).
A dimensional or ‘feature-mapping’ approach may offer a solution to the challenging, and likely
fruitless, endeavour of strictly categorising the socialness and intelligence of robots (Figure 1B). A
number of research teams have previously touched upon the topic of feature mapping from both
HRI [20–23] and social cognition [24,25] perspectives. However, previous proposals have almost
exclusively focused on social and psychological aspects of perceiving robots, thus making
comparisons between objects, social machines, and humans difficult. By contrast, the type of
dimensional approach we propose has a broader scope and considers all objects (including
social machines) across a range of relevant dimensions (e.g., form,motion, size, social capabilities).
Our approach is not intended to be prescriptive about which dimensions are most important in a
given context, as the development and validation of dimensions demand their own substantial line4 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx
Box 1. Respecting the Variety of Machines and Research Goals
Variety in HRI research is not limited to the type of machine; a wide variety of aims also exist. Such aims range from under-
standing different levels of description such as psychological, cognitive, and neurobiological, as well as work that aims to
probe how basic systems operate when people encounter and interact with robots, right up to applications in robotics,
such as in the service industry, education, healthcare, and therapy. These aims also include whether a particular robot
meets the specific requirement for which it was originally built. Much like recent proposals in computational neuroscience,
where a wide variety of aims and objectives also proliferate [89], our argument is that HRI research will likewise benefit from
authors being clear about the stated aims of their work. Considerable debate, disagreement, and possibly confusion
exist regarding the purpose of computational modelling in neuroscience precisely because computational modellers are
pursuing not one goal, but many. We see many parallels between the computational neuroscience domain and HRI
research in this regard. Consequently, if HRI researchers were to routinely and explicitly justify the goal or goals of each
individual study, as discussed in a recent review paper [72], this should facilitate comparisons across studies, methods,
and robotics platforms, thus leading to more rapid progress in HRI as a field.
As one example, important differences exist between research that aims to understand the psychological aspects
underpinning HRIs in terms of how individuals think and act toward robots, and research that aims to investigate the un-
derlying cognitive and brain systems supporting HRI. Indeed, understanding how one feels or behaves towards a specific
robot (compared with humans or other robots, for example) may not always inform the structure of cognitive and brain
function. Likewise, the study of cognitive and brain function may not always yield useful insights into how a person may
feel or behave towards a robot. As such, the field of HRI stands to benefit if researchers are clearer regarding the extent
to which their aims are to understand how people perceive and interact with robots in terms of psychological variables
and/or to make inferences about the structure and function of underlying (neuro)cognitive systems (cf. [70]). Such research
aims can, of course, be related but are nonetheless distinct in important ways.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
OPEN ACCESSof research. Indeed, the individual features being evaluated might be nonlinear and multidimensional
themselves, with their importance varying depending on one’s research questions, as well as
complex contextual factors, such as how a machine is introduced to a person, the person’s
age, cultural background, or what they believe about that particular machine (cf. [26–29]).
Finally, the dimensions outlined in Figure 1B are simple examples to illustrate the value of a
dimensional (compared with a categorical) approach rather than a suggestion that these
dimensions should receive privileged status. As such, we anticipate that different research
questions may be best served by consideration of different dimensions.
More generally, dimensional approaches have been used successfully in psychopathology, where
one-to-one mappings between symptoms and diagnoses are rare, thus limiting the utility of neat
categorisations [30–33]. Likewise, person perception is often construed as a multidimensional
‘space’ that maps across a range of features, including faces, bodies, and traits [34–37]. In social
robotics research, combining higher-order broad categorisation with lower-order feature mapping
(including nonsocial features) may help establish more accurate expectations regarding machines.
For instance, an agent may look human-like but have limited social abilities (e.g., android robots,
such as Kondomoroid; Figure 1A) or may have human-like limbs but be unable to replicate
biological motion (e.g., the robots Pepper and iCub; Figure 1A). Such feature combinations
matter for psychological and brain-based research because an agent may be relatively
human-like along one dimension but not at all in other dimensions, which is likely to impact
mental processes in (as yet) unknown ways.
Placing a greater emphasis on the variety of machines and their associated features is the first
central pillar of the current proposal and has both theoretical and practical implications. In
terms of theory development, under a dimensional account, it becomes unsurprising that an ar-
tificial agent could engage systems similar to those of a human. This is because such agents were
explicitly designed to look or behave in a human-like manner on some level [28,38–41] (Box 2).
From an applied perspective, rapid progress continues toward developing social machines for
a variety of applications, including domestic service, education, and healthcare [42,43]. EachTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 5
Box 2. Cautionary Tales for Cognitive Neuroscience Investigations into Human–Machine Interaction
Like any new field of research, research examining human interactions with social machines can learn from the successes
and failures of other research domains [74]. We highlight several cautionary tales that cover feature similarity across agents
and theory development. First, in terms of feature similarity across agents, a danger exists that one could take an object
(such as a cardboard box), add human features (such as a pair of eyes), and then show similarity on some level between
the mechanisms that process our interactions with this box and with other people. It seems difficult for the outcome to be
otherwise because, by construction, the object has been given those qualities, and we have known for over 70 years that
simple shapes can be perceived to have human-like qualities (e.g., [39]).
The situation is reminiscent of research that has used reaction time paradigms and social stimuli. If you compare a social
stimulus (e.g., eye gaze, body orientation) and a nonsocial stimulus (e.g., an arrow), which both have a common feature
(a directional cue), then some similarity in processing should be expected in terms of directional cueing. Indeed, using
a Posner-style cueing task [90], eye-gaze stimuli that look leftward or rightward cue attention and in a similar manner to
arrows [91,92]. Likewise, a body or an arrow that faces left or right also biases the speed of judgments to locations in
space [93,94]. Of course, this does not mean that these stimuli are identical. It simply means that they partly share a direc-
tional cue.When people and arrows are set in real-world contexts, it becomes easier to see how directional cues from peo-
ple and arrows may operate differently, such that social cues dominate arrow cues [95,96]. As such, we feel that feature
similarity in social cognition research is an important strand of research to consider when designing and interpreting HRI
studies. Moreover, this also underscores why research performed with embodied, physically co-located robots is so vital
for advancing HRI research compared with work that focuses on static robot images presented on screens [54,80,97],
and this echoes calls for increasing use of ‘real-life’ neuroscience approaches in general [44,98,99].
The second cautionary tale concerns theory development. Consider a prototypical human neuroimaging study that shows
relatively more or less engagement (or effective connectivity or pattern similarity) in brain regions during conditions that
involve a robot compared with a human. If these findings are not supported by sufficient theory to say why or how they
should or should not differ, how should one interpret the results? The often-implicit alternative hypothesis represents a null
hypothesis; that is, no overlapping systems should emerge. However, a completely nonoverlapping hypothesis represents
a weak theoretical position, because it seems unlikely that such an object would be processed without any similarity to
human interactions based on the way such robots are designed to share human features. Without clearer theoretical
foundations, therefore, which should facilitate more specific alternative predictions [100], the work is almost impossible
to falsify, thus reducing its value.
Trends in Cognitive Sciencescontext is already inspiring the development of a host of different robots brought to market, each
designed to perform a particular task or service. This highlights the value and timeliness of
clarifying the extent to which neurocognitive mechanisms of HRI generalise across robots and
contexts.
Broadening the Theoretical Field of View to Incorporate Diverse and Interacting
Neurocognitive Systems
As emphasised in a recent paper [44], most research examining how people perceive social
robots has focused almost exclusively on comparing brain and behavioural responses when
people encounter robots versus humans (e.g., [28,38,40,45–51]). Built into this approach is a largely
implicit assumption that it is useful to consider a robot as a humanwearing a tin suit. To some extent,
this approach is valid and can add value. If robots have human qualities by design, it seems sensible
to use human social interaction as a model system [19,52–57]. For example, using social cognition
as amodel systemmight tell us whether perceiving a particular robot’s face comparedwith a human
face is associated with activation of overlapping or distinct brain regions [47].
However, although progress has been made using social cognition as the default model,
restricting theoretical and empirical focus to this model will fundamentally limit further progress
for at least three reasons. First, as discussed earlier (also see Box 2), adding human features to
a non-human object and then measuring similarity in a behavioural or neural measure to human
interactions can only get us so far. By construction, the object was given human qualities, and
therefore it seems almost guaranteed to be processed similarly to a human on some level or to
some degree. It remains unclear, however, whether this adds to our understanding of cognitive
and brain systems in meaningful ways. Second, robots share qualities with tools and objects,6 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx
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OPEN ACCESSas well as nonsocial artificial agents and non-human animals [58]. In principle, therefore, research
examining object, tool, and animal interactions seems as valuable as social cognition research
(cf. [44]). Third, general cognitive and brain functions, such as those associated with aspects of
memory, attention, and semantics, have been undervalued in HRI research to date, even though
strong arguments exist for considering these in combination with more specialised, category-
selective processes [59–61].
We suggest that the shared feature space between social machines and objects holds as much
potential to develop an explanatory framework as do the shared features between social
machines and humans. Moreover, several advantages come with embracing additional and
broader domains of cognition. First, our understanding of object perception, as well as generalized
cognitive processes, is more developed than social cognition. For example, in object perception,
more comprehensive understanding exists about interactions between visual cortex and anterior
brain regions integrating visual object features with top-down factors, such as emotional valence
and context (e.g., [62–64]). As a consequence, a greater focus on the similarities, rather than
differences, in underlying cognitive architectures supporting object and social perception
holds value. It is worth noting that the same observation was made in seminal early social cog-
nition work by Fritz Heider [65], which has been overlooked in recent years in favour of a focus
on differences between objects and people. Likewise, memory and attention have been stud-
ied for decades, with work spanning multiple species and using a variety of methods. This pro-
vides an extensive evidence base upon which to ground new hypotheses and research
questions that are also relevant to HRI research [66–69].
Second, increased consideration of how broader and more established research programmes
mesh and interact with social cognition can help sharpen the specificity of the inferences being
made. For example, given that social cognition is a product of domain-general and domain-
specific (social) systems, a key inference concerns stimulus specificity [14]: Are observed effects
tied to the socialness of the stimulus in question, or do they reflect a more general mechanism
that applies to many categories and features of objects? The same logic applies to studying
encounters with social machines. Study designs that compare responses when we perceive or
interact with humans compared with robots can lack sufficient stimulus specificity to demonstrate
the involvement of specifically social cognitive and brain processes. A consequence is that
outcomes can be difficult to interpret in the ways that HRI researchers typically want to interpret
them, which is in relation to specifically social brain systems being ‘reused’ during interactions
with non-human agents (e.g., [70]). What follows can be amismatch between the level of specificity
inferred and the level of specificity demonstrated by the evidence. An alternative and deflationary
position is that general mechanisms of attention (as one example), which are not tied to social
stimuli, such as inhibition, alerting, filtering, and orienting, are involved in interactions with humans
and machines. Therefore, an important challenge for future theoretical and empirical work into HRI
will be separating general mechanisms from those tied to social interactions, as well as
characterising the interplay between these mechanisms. This example demonstrates how taking
a broader perspective, which includes a strong foothold anchored in diverse literatures, should
add value by guiding theoretical expectations and placing important constraints on inferences.
Consequently, the second central pillar of our proposal for HRI research going forward is that
knowledge from other cognitive domains, including object perception, memory, attention, and
semantics [66–69,71], should be considered together with social cognition research findings.
The balance between the role played by these different systems may vary as a function of
robot and research context, and it is likely to evolve as experience and expectations change.
Therefore, mapping the relationship between these systems across different robots, as well asTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 7
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesover repeated exposures, or after watching the latest Hollywood blockbuster film featuring a
robotic protagonist or villain, becomes an important new avenue to probe the structure of
associated cognitive and brain systems. In short, we suggest that the default expectation should
be that HRI will involve interplay between diverse forms of cognition and experience. Although it
currently seems impossible to account for all cognitive systems and processes involved, it is also
not sufficient to focus exclusively on social cognition (Figure 2A). Even so, it is clear that the
adoption of an integrated approach is still limited, given that adding together knowledge gained
from studying interactions with objects, machines, and humans cannot add up to a complete
understanding of HRIs (Figure 2B). Therefore, in the following section, we highlight some of the
unique challenges facing HRI research, which extend beyond traditional lines of investigation in
cognitive and social neuroscience.
Unique Challenges and Opportunities for Studying Human and Social Machines
The third central pillar of the current proposal is that the unique demands presented by interacting
with social machines must be better incorporated into models of cognitive and brain function. In
the following, we consider salient examples of the challenges and opportunities faced by HRI
research. Although not an exhaustive summary, we use these examples to highlight that a central
challenge facing cognitive neuroscience research into HRIs is driven by a combination of
limited experience, varying expectations, and a wide variety of robots.
Knowledge and experience with objects, tools, animals, and humans involve many concrete
examples of canonical forms, features, and functions, which provide a rich set of priors that
shape perception and interaction with these objects or agents. This is categorically not the case
where robots are concerned. Beyond the wide variety of robot models with bespoke mappings
between form and function, robots represent a far more novel category for human perceivers
and interactors. The novel nature of robots, particularly embodied robots that are encountered
in situ, means that we have considerably less experience interacting with robots than we do with
humans, which has a range of consequences.
One consequence of robot novelty is that we are likely to have vague, uncertain, and unrealistic
expectations about what these robots can do or how they might behave, which have been shaped
and skewed by media exposure (Box 3). Complicating this issue further are discrepancies in
human behaviour toward social robots when encountering such robots ‘in the wild’ (such as in a
shopping mall or airport) compared with in a laboratory. It is estimated that approximately 75%
of HRI studies are laboratory based [72] and that the majority of these studies use Wizard of Oz
methods [73], where the experimenter controls the robot’s behaviours and responses
unbeknownst to the participant. These facts cast considerable ambiguity over the specificity of
the claims being made when it comes to the structure of cognitive systems. Indeed, methods
used in laboratory research often unrealistically portray the capabilities of robots, as they depict
not autonomous, artificially intelligent robots but human-controlled robots more akin to sophisti-
cated puppets. This reality applies to the vast majority of social robotics research [74] and raises
important questions regarding whether inferences from these studies are limited to Wizard of
Oz–style methods or might be generalised to interactions with autonomous robots. The distinction
is important and highlights a major validity concern for the field, given that the overarching goal of
most HRI research is to make the latter inference whilst using the former method.
Another challenge is presented by mismatches between robot form and function. As mentioned
previously, some of the most human-like robots, including Kondomoroid (pictured in Figure 1A)
or Hanson Robotics Sophia, might superficially appear similar to humans (especially in static
photographs), but even the briefest interaction will reveal limited social capacity. Contrast this8 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx
Box 3. Managing Expectations and Curbing Enthusiasm: Media’s Role in Shaping Human Encounters with Artificially Intelligent S Social Machines
Contemporary society is awash with news articles appearing on an almost daily basis, proclaiming breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and robotics technology. Many
of these same articles also include dire narratives that ask whether, as humans, our days as workers, companions, carers, and even lovers are numbered (e.g., [101]).
Importantly, however, most people’s predictions about what living and working alongside robots might look like is based not on firsthand experience with robots but
instead on science fiction depictions of robots found in popular media, including books, films, television, and video games [102,103]. Evidence suggests that people’s
exposure to robots in the media has an outsized influence on howwe perceive robots, because, as roboticist Christoph Bartneck [102] put it, ‘[A]lmost all our knowledge
about robots stems from themedia… [and] this tension between expectations fuelled fromSciFi and the actual abilities of robots can result in negative experiences’ (p. 64).
Thismismatch between science fiction–fuelled expectations and current robot reality shapes our expectations, and thus howweperceive and interact with artificially socially
intelligent machines, in at least two ways. First, depictions of technologically sophisticated and highly intelligent machines, such as those depicted in Figure IA and B, sug-
gest that robots will look andmove just like us while also possessing superior powers of perception, strength, computation, and so forth. It is unsurprising that people report
being terrified of such agents (e.g., [101,103]) and the roles they might take on in society. The reality is that no currently available embodied robot comes close to cinematic
depictions of robots portrayed by leading Hollywood actors. Nevertheless, these dystopian visions shape people’s expectations about robots theymight encounter in social
spaces in the near future. A second consequence of media depictions of robots establishing unrealistic expectations comes from the range of helpful, kind, or socially as-
sistive behaviours performed by robots more often found in the categories depicted in Figure IC, D. Here again, the current robot reality will leave people sorely
disappointed if they expect the robot assisting with check-in at the airport might show and evoke as much empathy as Wall-E or demonstrate the loyalty portrayed by
BB-8. We would argue that no other category of object or agent is as susceptible to influences beyond one’s direct experience, and finding ways to account for media-
shaped expectations when encountering these agents (beyond filling out a short questionnaire; e.g., [104,105]) will be crucial for building a more complete understanding
of human–machine interaction in social spheres.
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Figure I. Depictions of Artificially Intelligent Social Machines in Popular Media. Such depictions can be roughly categorised into four groups, based on social
similarity to real people. (A) Human actors playing the role of highly sophisticated (and often dangerous or deadly) androids, such as (clockwise from top left) Ava in
Ex Machina, Maeve Millay in Westworld, Data in Star Trek, and T-800 from Terminator. (B) Human actors playing robots but wearing full-body robot suits to disguise
identifying human features, including robotic Maria from Metropolis, Robby the Robot from Forbidden Planet, C-3PO from Star Wars, and the robot from Robot and
Frank. (C) Mechanically animated or human-animated robots that neither look nor move like humans but operate in human spaces to help or harm people, including
the Daleks from Dr. Who, Number 5 from Short Circuit, and R2-D2 and BB-8 from Star Wars. (D) Animated depictions of robots unbound by laws of physics and
real-world plausibility, including Astro Boy, Rosey the Robot from The Jetsons, Optimus Prime, and Wall-E and EVE.
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OPEN ACCESSwith other artificially intelligent machines, such as Amazon’s Echo, which resembles a cylindrical
paperweight in appearance, not much larger than a water bottle. Equipped with the Alexa virtual
assistant artificial intelligence technology and a human-like voice, however, this seemingly simple
object has access to a world of knowledge and can conversationally engage people to a certain
extent (though again, it takes little probing for this technology to fail the Turing Test). In both
instances, the form of the agent is not clearly linked to its expected functional capacity. As a
consequence, nonstraightforward links between how form is assessed in perceptual systems
and how inferences and expectations regarding functional capacity are generated would need to
be built into cognitive and brain models of HRI.
People’s general lack of experience with robots in the real world, which can be further exacer-
bated by cultural and socioeconomic factors (e.g., [29]), also means that the stage of learning
about these machines is different from that regarding people and common objects. With such
‘immature’ representations (in terms of both phylogeny and ontogeny) comes more opportunity
for trial-and-error learning rather than consolidated forms of learning. Here again, an earlierTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 9
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesstage of learning means that cognitive and brain systems should be less coherent within and
across people, meaning researchers should expect noisier signals at brain and behavioural levels
when probing HRIs. Although this has the potential to make interactions between humans and
robots less reliable and tractable to study, it also presents an opportunity to study intra- and
interindividual differences. Individual differences are clearly at play within the domains of object
perception and social cognition (e.g., [75–77]), and we would predict them to be even more pro-
nounced when interacting with social machines due to the vast range of expectations people hold
regarding robots in particular.
Because most people are inexperienced in directly interacting with robots, this presents a prime
opportunity to explore the impact of experience and learning on the cognitive and brain systems
that support HRI. For example, a study examining automatic imitation of actions performed by
a human hand and a robotic claw demonstrates that a bias toward human hand actions disappears
after repeated exposure to actions performed by a robotic claw [78]. Moreover, when toddlers had
access to a small social robot in a childcare setting across a 5-month period, they started to treat
this robot more like a peer than a toy [79]. Conversely, other evidence suggests that repeated social
interactions with the Cozmo robot (Figure 1A) does not lead to any quantitative or qualitative changes
in empathy toward this robot, as measured by behavioural and brain measures [45]. As such,
although learning and long-term exposure measures will be vital for exploring human–machine cog-
nition, it will be imperative to carefully design and interpret these studies, keeping in mind that more
exposure will not necessarily meanmachine- or robot-directed cognition taking on a more social fla-
vour. A better understanding of human brain plasticity during long-term engagement with social
machines is vital because the neurocognitive mechanisms that support these interactions will be
continually changed by this technology as rapidly as we continue to develop it.
Exploring Future Encounters between Human Minds and Machines
Research using social cognition as a model for examining the mental processes that support
interactions with social machines hasmade valuable contributions to knowledge andwill continue
to do so [18,19,44,53,54,80]. Building on these initial steps, the central argument of this piece is
that we can accelerate progress by broadening the scope of investigation within HRI research to
incorporate other domains of cognition that may be equally useful, such as object perception, at-
tention, and many more besides (Figure 2B,C). One key strength of the proposed framework is
that it encourages a focus on theory building and highlights the value of posing questions in a
broader neurocognitive landscape. A further strength of the framework is that it encourages
investigation of how these basic building blocks of cognition flexibly adapt to the widespread
variety of social machines, as well as the unusual demands that interacting with such machines
may place on cognitive and brain systems. In short, we hope that the proposed framework high-
lights the inherent difficulty of the task at hand, which is likely to involve a complex and somewhat
atypical set of interacting mental pieces. In the following, we consider the implications of the
framework for future research, as well as its limitations.
By acknowledging similarities and differences between more established lines of investigation, HRI
researchers will be in a better position to set expectations accordingly and respect the inherent
challenge of the task at hand (subtext: it’s going to be bloody difficult). Conventional psychological
and brain science is beset with methodological and theoretical problems that involve the routine
use of questionable research practices that produce low levels of reproducibility [81–84]. In the
field of social robotics, a growing chorus of both established and emerging researchers is calling
for improvements to research quality, including preregistration; replication; and the sharing of
data, code, and stimuli [44,74]. On top of this, we have outlined here a number of additional chal-
lenges that cognitive (neuro)scientific investigations of HRI present.10 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx
Outstanding Questions
Given the unique challenges to
researching human interactions with
social machines, combined with the
reproducibility crisis in psychology
and neuroscience in general [80],
how should feasibility issues related
to establishing the neurocognitive
foundations of HRI be addressed?
To what extent are adequately powered
replication studies needed to guard
against the deleterious and long-lasting
impact of initial results that turn out to
be false-positive findings?
How much value would be added if
HRI hypotheses were more frequently
preregistered and specific analyses
clearly labelled as confirmatory versus
exploratory?
How do general and social cognitive
systems interact? How does robot
experience shape the influence exerted
by these different systems?
What is the relationship (and how does
it evolve) between media-shaped
expectations about social machines
and ongoing firsthand experience?
How can researchers and engineers
working to design social machines
capitalize upon new insights gained
from cognitive science–based investiga-
tions into HRI, and how should findings
that reveal more complexity and/or
murkiness in cognitive systems shape
real-life social robotics applications?
Will it ever be possible to design a
robot or other type of artificially
intelligent machine whose features,
appearance, and behaviours align with
naive human users’ expectations?
How do researchers account for (and
even capitalise upon) the continually
shifting landscape of our interactions
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OPEN ACCESSAt this stage, we would argue that a tone of cautious optimism is most appropriate. The promise
and potential of autonomous social machines that serve a number of service and entertainment
roles is undoubtedly exciting (as sci-fi has shown us and shaped our expectations for decades;
Box 3). In order to reach this goal, however, we must proceed carefully and respect the difficulty
of understanding the human side of HRI. Simple experimental manipulations that give inanimate ob-
jects human features may have limited explanatory power for developing interactive artificial agents
in the real world. Instead, it will be important to consider the multilevel nature of the target, which
spans wildly variable expectations, stages of learning, robotic platforms, and degrees of autonomy,
amongst others. This is why new theoretical work will be vital for generating and articulating relevant
questions as much as testing them [85–87]. Indeed, current challenges cannot be overcome by
simply running experiments with better control conditions. Put differently, it would be beneficial to
get the questions straight before deploying an army of different robots across different experimental
contexts. If not, wewill be stuck with the current challenge of how tomeaningfully interpret, let alone
generalise, findings that emerge. Given themanifold and unique challenges that HRI research faces,
providing clarity on scope, relevance, aims, and likely feasibility should be especially key concerns.
Concluding Remarks
In sum, the framework we discuss here aims to harness key insights from cognitive neuroscience to
address the novel and unusual demands posed by human interactions with social machines. As a
consequence, this framework has an intentionally focused scope, which is unlikely to be directly
or immediately relevant to the whole of social robotics. For example, the framework may have less
immediate relevance for those with shorter-term applied goals, such as using social robots in clinical
or commercial contexts. By explicitly acknowledging such constraints on the generality of our
proposal, we hope to help foster a more cumulative science by emphasising what is within and
beyond the purview of the proposal [88]. Indeed, as countless researchers have said before, true
progress in developing machines that engage humans on a social level will only come from
interdisciplinary collaboration across the social, life, and computing sciences (cf. [56]). A more
complete understanding of how the human mind and brain negotiate encounters with social
machines, therefore, will benefit from engaging the full spectrum of cognitive sciences, including
philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, as theory and empirical findings from these disciplines
clearly have much to offer this endeavour (see Outstanding Questions).
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